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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CITY OF PLEASANT GROVE,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
:

Case No. 970073-CA

:

Priority No. 2

vs.
MATTHEW

AUFFHAMMER,

Defendant/Appellant.

:

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT HAS MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE
The City asserts that Auffhammer has failed to marshal all
the evidence in support of the trial court's conclusion that
Auffhammer was driving under the influence of alcohol (Br. Of
Appellee at 8-12).

In support of this argument, the City asserts

that Auffhammer failed to specific facts in support of Judge
Backlund's decision.
One, the City asserts that Rasmussen "described the party he
and Auffhammer had attended as an "alcohol party'" (Br. of
Appellee at 10). The fact is that Rasmussen was attending an
"alcohol party" while Auffhammer—whom Rasmussen had not met
prior to that evening—came to the residence "apartment hunting"
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to inquire about renting a room (Tr. at 26-27, 38) .

See

Brief of

Appellant at 4.
Two, the City asserts that "Rasmussen unequivocally
testified that while at the 'alcohol party,' he had seen
Auffhammer drinking alcoholic beverages'' (Br. of Appellee at 10) .
However, Rasmussen amended his "unequivocal" testimony on crossexamination to being "pretty sure... I saw him with a beer at one
point (Tr. at 55; Brief of Appellant at 5 ) .
Three, the City asserts that "Rasmussen testified he told
the police that on the way home from the party, Auffhammer was
traveling at a high rate of speed" (Br. of Appellee at 10) .
Actually, Rasmussen's testimony was only that Auffhammer was
"over the speed limit" (Tr. at 30). The "high rate of speed"
language comes only from the prosecutor's question (Id.).
Four, the City asserts that Auffhammer has failed to marshal
the evidence concerning a prior intersection with a "stop" sign
(Br. of Appellee at 10). However, the citation referred to by
the City concerns dialogue between the Court and Rasmussen which
the City has taken out of context.

Rasmussen testified that he

might have stopped differently at a previous stop sign (Tr. at
41-42; Br. of Appellant at 5) and the trial court was not certain
whether he meant the stop sign at the site of the accident or
"some earlier stop sign" so he asked Rasmussen about it (Tr. at
58-59).

Rasmussen clarified that it was an earlier stop sign and
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that Auffhammer had basically executed a rolling stop past the
"sign a little bit" (Tr. at 59). At this point the judge
responded "All right.
talking about?" (Id.).

And that was it?

That's all you were

Rasmussen then replied "yeah" (Id.).

Five, the City asserts that Rasmussen testified that
"Auffhammer was slow to respond to the stop sign" at the site of
the accident (Br. of Appellee at 10). Actually, that language
comes from the prosecutor's question to which Rasmussen replied
"Yeah.

I m e a n — " (Tr. at 31-32).

But Rasmussen testified

further that what happened at the stop sign was "it just kind of
came, came upon us as a surprise" and that he could not see the
stop sign located where the accident occurred prior to reaching
the intersection (Tr. at 32, 42; Br. of Appellant at 6 ) .
Six, Auffhammer clearly indicates that Rasmussen testified
that he told Auffhammer after the accident not to leave the scene
but that Auffhammer left anyway (Br. of Appellant at 6 ) . The
City's assertion that Rasmussen's testimony clearly indicates
"Auffhammer wanted to avoid being identified at the scene so
shortly after he had been to an "alcohol party" (Br. of Appellee
at 10) is not a fact that Auffhammer has failed to marshal but an
inappropriate inference given the known facts of the case.
Seven, the facts surrounding Rasmussen's testimony about his
statement to the police, Officer Carter's discussion with
Auffhammer at the hospital on the next day, and Officer Smith's
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dialogue with Auffhammer are clearly marshaled in Auffhammer's
brief (Br. of Appellant at 6-7).

PQINT II
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT AUFFHAMMER
WAS DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE
At trial, Auffhammer was convicted of leaving the scene of
an accident and driving under the influence of alcohol.

Utah

Code Annotated Section 41-6-44(2) (1996 Supp.) sets forth the
elements of driving under the influence. Two of the elements of
this offense are at issue here: One, whether Auffhammer was
"under the influence of alcohol'' and two, whether that influence
rendered him "incapable of operating a vehicle".

Utah Code Ann.

41-6-44 (2) (a) (ii) .
A conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol
requires that a defendant to have consumed alcohol in an amount
sufficient to render him incapable of safely operating a vehicle.
The only evidence that Auffhammer consumed any alcohol came from
Rasmussen's testimony that he was "pretty sure" that Auffhammer
had drank a beer at the party (Tr. at 55).
In addition, the only evidence of any driving pattern by
Auffhammer was also Rasmussen's testimony.

Rasmussen testified

that he noticed no driving pattern that would cause him to
believe that Auffhammer was intoxicated but that he would have
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handled a previous stop sign differently (Tr. at 41, 59).
Rasmussen also testified that Auffhammer's speech was not slurred
prior to the accident and that he could detect no odor of
alcohol.
Based upon this evidence, Auffhammer asserts that there was
insufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that
he was driving under the influence of alcohol.

Auffhammer was

convicted of driving under the influence, not because of evidence
indicating that Auffhammer was in physical control of a vehicle
while impaired by alcohol, but because "the only reason he would
have left in... that injured condition... instead of waiting for
medical help was because he was under the influence of alcohol
and he didn't want to pick up a DUI" (Tr. at 89-90).

The trial

court went so far as to call Auffhammer "a liar" although
Auffhammer never testified (Tr. at 92). Accordingly, Auffhammer
asks this court to reverse the driving under the influence
conviction based upon the clear error in the trial court's
finding.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Because the conviction for driving under the evidence is not
supported by the evidence, Auffhammer asks this Court to reverse
his conviction of that crime.
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DATED this

**

day of November, 1997

Margaret/P. Lindsay
//""~
Attorney for Auffhammer
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